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Abstract 
In the new economy, companies try to convey to their stakeholders that they are a good investment and Attempt 
highlight the good value of the company via disclosure of pertinent information in the annual reports. This paper 
investigates the relationship between corporate governance and ownership structure on voluntary disclosure, with a 
particular focus on variables affecting in voluntary disclosure of listed companies in the Amman Stock Exchange 
(ASE). Using a dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the period 2002-2011, this study of 72 Jordanian finds 
that the listed companies at ASE during 2002-2011 had shown a significant degree of voluntary disclosure in line 
with greater corporate governance awareness and implementation in Jordan. In particular, this paper found board 
activity, foreign ownership, non –executive directors and block holder ownership to be significant in influencing 
voluntary disclosure. Finally, this paper found that the voluntary disclosure in the annual reports does potentially 
affect the market capitalization. 
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Universiti Malaysia 
Kelantan, Malaysia 
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1.    Introduction 
Accounting disclosure is very important to all stakeholders; it provides them with the necessary 
information to reduce uncertainty and helps them to make suitable economic and financial decisions. The 
annual financial reports published by companies are considered one of the most important sources of 
information  to  outsiders  (Betosan  1997).  Annual  reports  are  used  as  a  communication  tool  to 
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communicate both quantitative and qualitative corporate information with stakeholders or with other 
interested parties (Barko, Hancock & Izan, 2006). 
 
These financial reports include information that may help in recognizing the financial position of the 
company, reflect the operation, structural and financial picture of the corporations to the stakeholders;, 
sometime the information’s provided may not be useful enough to meet the needs of some beneficiaries 
like investors, creditors, customers and the public, and anybody who is interested in the success of 
corporations. Disclosure within financial reports can be classified into two parts: mandatory and 
voluntary (non- mandatory) disclosure. Mandatory disclosure which is as any financial item disclosed 
within companies annual reports that are prescribed by accounting standards and / or the stock exchange 
regulations (Penmann, 1988). Voluntary disclosure means making public the financial and non-financial 
information regarding a firm’s operations without any legal requirement (Botosan, 1997; Naser & 
Nuseibeh, 2003; Alsaeed, 2006). Nasir, N. (2004) understanding why companies voluntarily disclose 
information is useful for both producers and users of accounting information, as well as for accounting 
policy (Buzbee, 1975; Meek, Gray & Roberts, 1995). 
 
Therefore, evidently today, various stock exchanges around the world require companies to prepare 
financial reports, with the objective to providing important stakeholders with timely and high quality 
financial information to help them make informed financing and investing decisions. In this context, 
Jordan has begun to implement the same financial procedure. Globalization has become the key word in 
the new world economy. Technology, communication and intense flow of information and trading across 
borders all make the world a small village; Jordan realizes that it needs to consider and adopt positive 
changes in order to be at par with other nations. Indeed, Jordan was one of the few countries in the Middle 
East to realize the importance of coping with the new trends of change occurring in the world. It is the 
first Arab country to join the Board of Directors of the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) in 1988, and has over the last 20 years since 1990 been practicing the International Accounting 
Standards (Naser, Al-Khatib, & Karbhari, 2002). 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the literature review on corporate 
governance and ownership. Section 3 describes research methodology, Section 4 presents the empirical 
results, and finally Section 5 provides a summary and some conclusions. 
 
2.    Literature Review 
Corporate governance has been in the spotlight for the past decade. Numerous scandals, such as 
thoseinvolving Enron, Tyco, Imclone Systems, WorldCom, exposed failures in corporate governance 
that shook the capital markets in developed countries. Restoration of public confidence or trust becomes 
the main agenda for today's business leaders (Heidi & Marlene, 2003).  Disclosing more information on 
the company's capital structure and control can be an important way to achieve that goal (Rogers, 2006). 
 
Beasley, et, al. (2000) emphasis the crucial role of full disclosure in avoiding financial reporting 
fraud. Guan, et al.(2007) find that to protect investors' rights and enhance information transparency, the 
regulatory authorities of securities markets and information intermediaries have exerted great effort to 
advocate corporate governance, thus lessening the occurrence of adverse selection and agency problems 
as a result of the information asymmetry. Corporate governance has been studied as a mechanism which 
affects corporate disclosure. Transparency, openness, disclosure and trust, which form the integral part of 
corporate governance, can exert pressures to improve financial performance (Rogers, 2006). 
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According to Archambault & Archambault, (2003), the level of accounting disclosure differs from 
one country to another and from one company to another in the same country. This is controlled by the 
different standards and regulations governing the disclosure of accounting to be followed and the degree 
of flexibility of their applicability. One important consequence of these differences is that it may 
negatively affect the quality of investment decisions based on information contained in the financial 
report. Improving the high level of disclosure information is positively thought to affect the investors’ 
confidence. 
 
Fama & Jensen (1983) and Jensen & Meckling, (1976) theorize that corporate governance 
mechanisms that  are  well  practiced  could  benefit  shareholders  financially  by  exercising  more  
control  on  the company’s management. Moreover, the corporate governance characteristics can be seen 
as proxies for independence and the alignment of interests between management and the shareholders in 
minimizing the agency conflict. 
 
Ownership structure is also considered one of the factors that affect the quality of the financial 
reporting process.  According  to  Eng  and  Mak  (2003),  the  structure  of  ownership  determines  the  
level  of monitoring, and thereby the level of disclosure. 
 
Many scholarly articles have been written and devoted more attention recently to the impact of 
corporate governance characteristics on voluntary disclosure among listed corporations in both developed 
and developing countries. They also draw attention to weak corporate governance in developing, 
emerging and transnational economies (Bremer & Elias, 2007). Due to the fact that no previous studies 
were keen to examine the impact of corporate governance characteristics, ownership structure and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure  in Middle Eastern countries in general and Jordan in particular, this study 
hopes to bridge the gap Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe. This research is 
considered important for this region, because companies in this region have less incentive for 
transparent and frequent disclosure than their Anglo-American and European counterparts. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
   
  3.1 Data 
This study focuses on financial reports provided by companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange 
(ASE) as per required by the Directives for Listing Securities on ASE for the period (2001-2010) 
regulations. This study will be applied on 73 non- financial companies listed in Amman stock exchange. 
On the other hand, the financial sector is not included because it has special regulations pertaining to 
financial reporting, issued from Jordan Central Bank and the Insurance Commission. 
 
The selection of the period (2002 to 2011) was made due to the following reasons. First, the year 2002 
was chosen according to Securities Law No.76 of 2002 was issued to support the voluntary disclosure. 
Second, the year 2011 was also chosen because the 2011 annual reports are considered as the latest source 
of information available at the time of the study for the entire sample. Data was gathered from the annual 
reports of selected companies and the data also obtained through the Bloomberg databases, for the period 
2002-2011, and other data from other resources like Jordan Securities Commission and Amman Stock 
Exchange. 
 
 
344   Amer Alhazaimeh et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  129 ( 2014 )  341 – 348 
 
  3.2 Variables Definitions 
Table 1 report briefly discusses the specific definitions of the variables used in 
this paper. 
VARIABLE ACRONYM MEASUREMENT 
Voluntary disclosure (VDI) The disclosure index is used to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure   (Cooke,   (1989);   Meek   et   al,   (1995);   Ghazali 
&Weetman, (2006); Haniffa & Cooke,(2002)and Nassir,(2004); Al-
Shammari, (2008). 
Audit committee (ACOM) Audit committee data will be coded (1) to indicate existence of 
audit committee and (0) to indicate non-existence (Ho & Wong, 
2001, Dezoort, 1997 and Wolnizer, 1995). 
Board compensation (BCOM) Board compensation is measured by the log of the total amount 
of  compensation  given  to  the  board  of  directors  for  each company. 
Board activity (BACT) Board activity is measured as the number of meetings of the 
board of directors per year (Anderson (2005). 
Board size (BSIZE) Board size is derived by counting the total number of directors 
on the board (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004). 
Non –executive directors (NEXED) Percentage  of  non  –executive  directors  will  be  measured  by 
dividing  the  number  of  non-executive  directors  with  total number of 
directors on the board (Franks, Mayer, & Renneboog, 
2001). Chen & Jaggi (2000) and Haniffa & Cooke (2002). 
Large audit firm (LAUD) Large audit firm will be measured by (1) if company has audited 
from big 4 audit firms and (0) if otherwise (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). 
 
Foreign ownership 
(FOW)  
Foreign ownership will be measured by log of percentage of shares owned 
by foreigners to total number of shares issued, following (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Wang et al, 2008). 
Government ownership (GOW) Government ownership will be measure by percentage of shares 
owned  by  government  to  total  number  of  shares  issued, following 
(Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; Wang et al, 2008). 
Block holder ownership (BLK) Block holder ownership measured by calculating the proportion 
of shares held by institutional investors; this proportion must equal or 
exceed 5% of total shares. Eng and Mak (2003). 
 
Number of shareholders 
(NSHA) Number of shareholders measured by counting the total number 
of the shareholders for each company (Al Muhannadi, 2004; Gharaebeh & 
Naber, 1987; Malone, Fries, & Jones, 1993; Singhvi & Desai, 1971). 
 
3.3 Dynamic Panel GMM 
 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is a dynamic panel approach which takes account of 
the impact of past voluntary disclosures on the current one. It employs a sample with a short time-period 
but a large number of firms. System GMM was developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) to improve the efficiency of first difference GMM developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). It consists of two equations of level and first difference that each one adopts Instrumental 
Variables  (IV)  to  remove  the  correlation  between  explanatory  variables  and  residuals.  Generally 
speaking, GMM approach has salient advantages in dealing with short-sample periods, heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and heterogeneity, endogenous and predetermined explanatory variables. Hence, it 
improves the efficiency of the estimates dramatically. The success of the GMM estimator in producing 
unbiased, consistent and efficient results is highly dependent on the adoption of the appropriate 
instruments. Therefore, there are three diagnostic tests; namely Hansen/Sargan test of over identifying 
restrictions, AR (2), and the difference in Hansen test.   
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First, the Hansen/Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions examines the overall validity of the 
instruments by analyzing the sample analogue of the moments conditions used in the estimation 
process. If the moment condition holds, then the instrument is valid and the model has been correctly 
specified. Second, AR (2) conducts a test on residuals to show whether there is no serial correlation 
among the transformed error terms. Third, to test the validity of extra moment’s conditions on the 
system GMM, the difference in Hansen test is used. This test measures the difference between the 
Hansen statistic generated from the system GMM and the difference GMM. Failure to reject the three 
null hypotheses gives support to the estimated model 
 
4.     Results 
 
Table 2 reports the estimated results of the determinants of voluntary disclosure using two-step 
system GMM. The results indicate voluntary disclosure has a trend over time by which past voluntary 
disclosure significantly influences the current one. Nevertheless, some factors concurrently affect 
disclosures, such as board compensation, foreign ownership, government ownership, and block holder 
ownership. For instance, block holder ownership negatively and significantly reduces voluntary 
disclosures. Specifically, an  increase  in  the  block  holder  ownership  leads  to  a  contemporaneously 
decline  in  the  voluntary disclosure by 0.04228 point. Higher board compensation and foreign 
ownership urge firms to disclose their information voluntarily. The results imply insignificant 
coefficients for some factors, such as audit committee, board activity, and non –executive directors in 
spite of our expectation of significant contribution to the voluntary disclosure. It can be due to the fact 
that they are still far from their efficient points  which  require  policy  makers  and  managers  to  adopt  
strategies  to  facilitate  the  process  of disclosure. 
 
The results of the both specification tests that are AR (2) for testing the serial correlation and the 
Hansen test for testing the validity of instrument adopted are also valid. As shown in Table 2, the p-values 
for the AR (2) and Hansen tests are higher than 0.10, that is, statistically insignificant at the ten percent 
significance level. This implies that the empirical model has been correctly specified because there is no 
serial correlation (autocorrelation) in the transformed residuals, and the instruments (moments conditions) 
used in the models are valid. The additional moment conditions such as difference in Hansen tests are 
also statistically insignificant but not reported in order to save space. 
 
Table 2: The Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure: Two-Step System GMM 
 
Coefficients Standard Error P-Value 
Voluntary index 0.22461*** 0.01455 0 
Audit committee 0.59656 0.98710 0.546 
Board compensation 0.00003** 0.00001 0.032 
Board activity 0.21840 0.17590 0.214 
Board size 0.02137 0.16490 0.897 
Non –executive directors 0.73462 1.18703 0.536 
Number of employee 0.00022 0.00039 0.568 
Foreign ownership 0.05998*** 0.01301 0 
Government ownership 0.05019*** 0.00893 0 
Number of shareholders 0.00003 0.00004 0.493 
Block holder -0.04228*** 0.01476 0.004 
Economic Freedom 1.65412 0.13970 0 
 
Number of instruments 56 
Number of observations 598 
Number of groups 72 
AR(2)-p value 0.350 
Hansen/Sargan test –p value 0.563 
*, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively. Year dummies and constant are 
not included  in  order  to  save  space.  All  p-values  of  the  difference  in  Hansen  tests  of  
exogeneity of instruments subsets have also been rejected at least at 10 percent significant level. 
 
 
 
 
346   Amer Alhazaimeh et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  129 ( 2014 )  341 – 348 
5.    Conclusion 
The role of voluntary disclosure has been studied extensively in advanced countries; however 
little attention has been given to investigating this issue in a small-open economy. Therefore, to fill this 
gap in the  previous  literature,  this  study  focuses  on  the  relationship  between  corporate  
governance  and ownership structure on voluntary disclosure in annual reports among listed Jordanian 
companies using a dynamic panel data framework. 
This paper aims to shed light on the determinants of the extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
Jordanian listed firms for the period (2002-2011). Findings reveal that Jordanian companies adopt 
voluntary disclosure on different types of information. This paper additionally examined the effect of 
corporate governance and ownership structure on the extent of voluntary disclosure. The results indicate 
voluntary disclosure has a trend over time by which past voluntary disclosure significantly influences 
the current one. Nevertheless, some factors concurrently affect disclosures, such as board compensation, 
foreign ownership, government ownership, and block holder ownership. For instance, block holder 
ownership negatively and significantly reduces voluntary disclosures. The study also reveals that larger 
companies disclose more information than smaller companies in Jordan. 
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